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Abstract To devise efficient approaches and tools for detecting malicious packages in the Android ecosystem, researchers
are increasingly required to have a deep understanding of malware. There is thus a need to provide a framework for dissecting
malware and locating malicious program fragments within app code in order to build a comprehensive dataset of malicious
samples. Towards addressing this need, we propose in this work a tool-based approach called HookRanker, which provides
ranked lists of potentially malicious packages based on the way malware behaviour code is triggered. With experiments on
a ground truth of piggybacked apps, we are able to automatically locate the malicious packages from piggybacked Android
apps with an accuracy@5 of 83.6% for such packages that are triggered through method invocations and an accuracy@5 of
82.2% for such packages that are triggered independently.
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1 Introduction
Malware is pervasive in the Android ecosys-
tem. This is unfortunate since Android is the most
widespread operating system in handheld devices and
has increasing market shares in various home and office
smart appliances. As we now heavily depend on mobile
apps in various activities that pervade our modern life,
security issues with Android web browsers, media play-
ers, games, social networking or productivity apps can
have severe consequences. Yet, regularly, high profile
security mishaps with the Android platform shine the
spotlight on how easily malware writers can exploit a
large attack surface, eluding all detection systems both
at the app store level and at the device level.
Nonetheless, research and practice on malware de-
tection have produced a substantial number of ap-
proaches and tools for addressing malware. The litera-
ture contains a large body of such work[1-4]. Unfor-
tunately, the proliferation of malware[5] in stores and
on user devices is a testimony that 1) state-of-the-art
approaches have not matured enough to significantly
address malware, and 2) malware writers are still able
to react quickly to the capabilities of current detec-
tion techniques. Broadly, malware detection techniques
either leverage malware signatures or build machine
learning (ML) classifiers based on static/dynamic fea-
tures. On the one hand, it is rather tedious to manually
build a (near) exhaustive database of malware signa-
tures: new malware or modified malware is thus likely
to slip through. On the other hand, ML classifiers are
too generic to be relevant in the wild: features currently
used in the literature, such as n-grams, permissions or
system calls, allow to flag apps without providing any
hint on either which malicious actions are actually de-
tected, or where they are located in the app.
The challenges in Android malware detection are
mainly due to a lack of accurate understanding of
what constitutes a malicious code. In 2012, Zhou and
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Jiang[6] manually investigated 1 260 malware samples
to characterize: 1) their installation process, i.e., which
social engineering-based techniques (e.g., repackaging,
update-attack, drive-by-attack) are used to slip them
into users devices; 2) their activation process, i.e., which
events (e.g., SMS RECEIVED) are used to trigger the ma-
licious behaviour; 3) the category of malicious pack-
ages (e.g., privilege escalation or personal information
stealing); 4) how malware exploits the permission sys-
tem. The produced dataset named MalGenome, has
opened several directions in the research of malware de-
tection, most of which either have focused on detecting
specific malware types (e.g., malware leaking private
data[7]), or are exploiting features such as permissions
in ML classification[8]. The MalGenome dataset how-
ever has shown its limitations in hunting for malware:
the dataset, which was built manually, has become ob-
solete as new malware families are now prevalent; the
characterization provided in the study is too high-level
to allow the inference of meaningful structural or se-
mantic features of malware.
The ultimate goal of our work is to build an ap-
proach towards systematizing the dissection of Android
malware and automating the collection of malicious
code packages in Android apps. Previous studies, in-
cluding our own, have exposed statistical facts which
suggest that malware writing is performed at an “indus-
trial” scale and that a given malicious piece of code can
be extensively reused in a bulk of malware[5-6]. Malware
writers can indeed simply unpack a benign, preferably
popular app, and then graft some malicious code on it
before finally repackaging it. The resulting app, which
thus piggybacks malicious packages, is referred to as
a piggybacked app. Our assumption that most mal-
ware is piggybacked of benign apps is confirmed with
the MalGenome dataset where over 80% of the samples
were built through repackaging. For simplicity, in this
entire paper we refer to any code package injected via
piggybacking as a “malicious” package. Actually, such
a package may 1) directly contribute in implementing
the malicious behaviour, 2) contribute in further hiding
malicious operations to static analyzers, or 3) provide
commodity functions (e.g., in the form of a library)
which are exploited by piggybackers to facilitate pay-
load hooking.
Identifying and extracting accurately malicious code
in an app is however a challenging endeavour. In any
case, a malicious behaviour can be implemented as
an orchestration of different behaviour steps in several
packages. To the best of our knowledge, state-of-the-art
studies mainly leverage comparison-based approaches
(either 1-to-1[9] or 1-to-n[10] comparison) to pinpoint
malicious payloads. Approaches analysing solely a mal-
ware sample, to systematically identify packages which
contribute to malicious behaviour implementation, are
scarce. Our objective is therefore to propose a step
towards helping analysts to readily identify malicious
packages in Android apps without requiring the availa-
bility of other apps for comparison. To that end, we
build HookRanker, a ranking approach which orders
packages with regard to the likelihood of their malicious
status. Overall, we make the following contributions.
• We propose an automated approach for locat-
ing hooks (i.e., code that either switches the execution
context from benign to malicious code or triggers ma-
licious code independently) within piggybacked apps.
Our approach eventually yields two ranked lists of most
probable malicious packages, which can benefit malware
analysts to quickly understand how the malicious be-
haviour is implemented and how the malicious code is
triggered. A key characteristic of our approach is that
it does not require to have the original benign version of
the piggybacked app, which is usually hard to harvest,
in order to perform some form of difference analysis.
• We present a tool called HookRanker to auto-
matically recommend potential malicious packages and
components. Evaluations on a set of benchmark apps
have demonstrated that HookRanker is efficient to lo-
cate malicious packages of piggybacked apps.
•We experimentally show that our work can imme-
diately be leveraged, to some extent, by researchers and
practitioners to build classifiers that output explainable
results, i.e., when an app is flagged as a malware, one
understands precisely that it exhibits features from a
particular malicious package, and thus it is straightfor-
ward to indicate the relevant type/family of malware.
Reproducibility. We make our dataset and experi-
mental results available online 1○.
This paper is an extended and improved version of
a short paper[11] presenting preliminary results at the
2017 International Conference on Mobile Software En-
gineering and Systems (MobileSoft). In the previous
version, we have explored solely Type1 hook for pig-
gybacked apps, although we have actually shown that
there are in total two types of hooks (including Type1
and Type2 hooks (see Listing 1)). In this extension, in
addition to Type1 hook, which involves method calls for
triggering piggybacked rider code, we further explore
1○https://github.com/serval-snt-uni-lu/HookRanker, Nov. 2017.
1110 J. Comput. Sci. & Technol., Nov. 2017, Vol.32, No.6
1 //Activity for launching the app
2 public class com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerProxyActivity extends android .app.Activity {
3 protected void onCreate (android .os.Bundle ) {
4 $r0 := @this: com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerProxyActivity;
5 $r1 := @parameter0: android .os.Bundle;
6 $b0 = 1;
7 specialinvoke $r0.<android .app.Activity : void onCreate (android .os.Bundle)>($r1);
8 + staticinvoke <com.gamegod .Touydig : void init(android .content .Context )>($r0);
9 $r2 = newarray (java.lang.String)[2];
10 $r2[0] = "com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerActivity";
11 $r2[1] = "com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerNativeActivity";
12 staticinvoke <com.unity3d .player.UnityPlayerProxyActivity: void
copyPlayerPrefs(android .content .Context ,java.lang.String []) >($r0 , $r2);
13 }}
14
15 // Broadcast Receiver for listening PACKAGE_ADDED , CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE, and BOOT_COMPLETED events
16 + public class com.mobile.co.UR extends AdPushReceiver {...}
Listing 1. Example of Type1 and Type2 hooks. This snippet is extracted from a real piggybacked app named apscallion.sharq2. The
“+” sign indicates the code that was injected into the origin app.
Type2 hook for piggybacked malicious apps, where the
malicious rider code is triggered through the use of An-
droid event system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 provides the necessary background informa-
tion related to piggybacked apps, including the piggy-
backing terminology to which we will refer in this pa-
per. Section 3 presents our approach for automatically
locating malicious packages in piggybacked apps. We
evaluate our work in Section 4 and discuss the threats
to validity as well as outlook in Section 5. Section 6
discusses related work and Section 7 concludes this pa-
per.
2 Preliminaries
We now provide preliminary details that are essen-
tial for understanding the purpose, techniques and key
concerns of Android piggybacking. In particular, we
first briefly introduce the terminology related to the
piggybacking process in Subsection 2.1. Then, in Sub-
section 2.2, we present the Android app launch model,
which is central to how malicious packages in piggy-
backed apps can be reached for triggering malicious be-
haviour. Next, we summarize in Subsection 2.3 the
techniques that are leveraged by malware writers to
graft piggybacking code with existing app code. Fi-
nally, in Subsection 2.4, we present the ground truth
dataset that we use in this work to evaluate the effec-
tiveness of HookRanker.
2.1 Piggybacking Terminology
We now introduce the necessary terminology to
which we will refer in the remainder of this paper.
Fig.1 shows the constituting parts of a piggybacked
malware 2○, which is built by taking a given original
app, referred to in the literature as the carrier[12], and
grafting malicious packages to it (also known as a piece
of malicious code 3○), referred to as the rider. The ma-
licious behaviour will be triggered thanks to the hook
that is inserted by the malware writer to ensure the
injected packages will be executed.
Android Apps
Malware
Piggybacked
Carrier Rider
Piggybacked
APP (a)
Hook
Original
APP (a)
Fig.1. Piggybacking terminology.
It is also noteworthy that, in this work, we make a
clear difference between piggybacking and repackaging,
two terms that are frequently used in the literature. In-
deed, unlike piggybacking, repackaging does not neces-
sarily include a modification of the bytecode of a given
2○In this work, we focus on piggybacked malicious apps, where the malicious state is ensured by the results of VirusTotal.
3○To simplify the description, in this work, we consider all the injected code as malicious, even if the actual malicious payload is
only some part of the added code.
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Android app. Instead, repackaging may simply be per-
formed to change the app certificate and thus switch
the ownership. However, piggybacking always implies
repackaging.
2.2 Android App Launch Model
Android apps are made up of four types of compo-
nents:
• Activity, which represents the graphical interface
of Android apps;
• Service, which is dedicated to performing time-
intensive tasks in the background;
• Broadcast Receiver, which is used in waiting
and resolving system as well as user-defined events;
• Content Provider, which provides a standard in-
terface for other components/apps to access app data.
Unlike traditional Java applications, which include
a single entry point (i.e., the main() function) to
launch the program, Android apps contain multiple en-
try points through which some parts of the app code
can be triggered: basically every component could be
an entry point. This situation can be exploited by pig-
gybackers as opportunities for triggering the execution
of their injected malicious packages. Fig.2 summarizes
typical examples of the common launch model of An-
droid apps. It illustrates that in addition to the normal
launch process (launcher), Android apps can actually
be triggered through system events and user-defined
events.
Service
Receiver 2
Activity
Launcher
System
Events
User Events
IF
IF
IF
Activity
System
System
Intent
Fig.2. Examples of the Android app launch model. IF indicates
intent filter.
Actually, the three aforementioned entry point
types are based on the inter-component communication
(ICC) mechanism. Each entry point (i.e., component)
has to declare at least one 4○ intent filter to specify how
it could be launched. In order to be a launcher entry
point, as shown in Listing 2, the launcher component
(activity in this case) has to declare an intent filter with
an action attribute named MAIN and a category at-
tribute named LAUNCHER (lines 24∼25). Similarly,
in order to be a system event-triggered entry point, a
component (usually receiver) must declare intent filters
to listen for some system events. When the declared
system events are fired, the component will be trig-
gered. Both a launcher entry point and a system event
triggered entry point can be used to start an app, but
they differ by the fact that a launcher entry point can
also be triggered via user events, e.g., an intent object
(with MAIN and LAUNCHER attributes filled) con-
structed with explicit targets in mind.
20 <manifest package ="rapscallion.sharq2">
21 <application >
22 activity :". UnityPlayerProxyActivity"
23 intent-filter
24 action:"android .intent.action.MAIN"
25 category "android .intent.category .LAUNCHER "
26
27 receiver :"com.mobile.co.UR"
28 intent-filter
29 action:"android .intent.action. PACKAGE_ADDED"
30 data:"package "
31 intent-filter
32 action:"android .net.conn.CONNECTIVITY_CHANGE"
33 intent-filter
34 action:"android .intent.action. BOOT_COMPLETED"
35 </application ></manifest >
Listing 2. Simplified manifest of app apscallion.sharq2.
2.3 Hook Types
Given the app launch model described above, we
infer that there are two ways for piggybackers to hook
their malicious code from the carrier code, i.e., to allow
the triggering of the payload in their injected malicious
packages. We refer to these two ways as Type1 hooks
and Type2 hooks.
• Type1 hook involves method calls that explicitly
connect carrier code to rider code. In this case, we iden-
tify the hook via the point 5○ where the carrier code is
switched into the rider code in the execution flow. List-
ing 1 shows a snippet illustrating an example of Type1
hook (line 8), which is inserted immediately at the be-
ginning of the onCreate() method (line 7) of component
UnityPlayerProxyAct. As shown in Listing 2, Unity-
PlayerProxyActivity is actually the app launcher, as in-
dicated by theMAIN action and LAUNCHER category.
When users launch the app, the first lifecycle method
onCreate() of component UnityPlayerProxyActivity will
be triggered. Consequently, the malicious packages
(starting from class com.gamegod.Touydig) will immedi-
4○It is possible to declare several intent filters. As shown in Listing 2, component com.mobile.co.UR declared three intent filters.
5○In our implementation we focus on identifying the Java package.
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ately be triggered (by calling the method init()), switch-
ing the current execution context to piggybacked code.
• Type2 hook involves the use of the Android event
system. Thus, the piggybacked code hooking is done
via a component that is explicitly connected to any
code of the original app. Instead, the (malicious)
rider code will be triggered directly by system or user-
defined events. Listing 1 also includes an example
of Type2 hook (line 16), where the whole component
named com.mobile.co.UR is injected during piggyback-
ing. Listing 2 illustrates the capabilities declared for
this component, which is registered to listen to three
different system events: 1) PACKAGE ADDED will
be fired when a new app is installed on the device;
2) CONNECTIVITY CHANGE will be fired when a
change related to network connectivity has occurred;
3) BOOT COMPLETED will be fired after the booting
process has completed. When any one of the aforemen-
tioned events is broadcasted, hook com.mobile.co.UR
will be triggered and consequently the malicious pack-
ages will be executed.
It is worth noticing that thanks to the definition of
piggybacked apps, which have been grafted with ma-
licious packages, there will be no such case that nei-
ther Type1 nor Type2 hooks are applied to piggybacked
apps.
2.4 Piggybacking Ground Truth Dataset
In this work, we leverage the ground truth that we
built in previous work[13] to perform our investigation.
This ground truth contains hundreds of pairs of pig-
gybacked and associated benign apps which were col-
lected from a large repository of millions of apps[14]
crawled over several months from several markets such
as the Google Play store, AppChina, and which was
used for large-scale experiments[15-17]. Each pair (ab,
am) consists of a benign app (ab) and a piggybacked
malicious app (am, where ab is the benign original coun-
terpart of am). As shown in Fig.3, we carefully ensure
that each pair of apps 1) have identical app package
name 6○, 2) are written by different authors 7○, 3) have
the same SDK version, and 4) have at least 80% similar
code[18]. The malicious state of a given app is checked
via VirusTotal 8○, which hosts over 50 anti-virus prod-
ucts from providers like Kaspersky, McAfee.
Identical Packages
543 002 Pairs (e.g., m -> b) 71 206 Pairs
Different
Authors
Malicious (m, m, ...)
Benign (b, b, ...)
1 497 Pairs
Same SDK/Version
Ground Truth (App Pairs)
VirusTotal
Similarity Results
Similarity Analysis
Ground Truth (Similarities)
Android
Apps
Fig.3. Ground truth building process.
3 Approach
Our primary objective of this work is to provide re-
searchers and practitioners with means to systematize
the collection of malicious packages that are used fre-
quently by malware writers. To that end, we propose to
devise an approach for automating the identification of
malicious code snippets which are used pervasively in
malware distributed as piggybacked apps. We are thus
interested in identifying malicious rider code as well as
the hook code which triggers the malicious behaviour
in rider code. To fulfill this objective we require a set
of reliable metrics to automatically identify malicious
packages within a detected piggybacked app.
Given a set of piggybacked malware, we aim at iden-
tifying the hooks that trigger the execution of rider
code and thereby ungrafting the malicious rider code
from piggybacked malicious apps. As introduced in
Section 2, there are two types of hooks leveraged by pig-
gybackers. These two types of hooks are significantly
different in terms of their behaviours, making it diffi-
cult to identify them through a single generic approach.
Therefore, in this work, we present two separate tech-
niques to identify the hooks. Fig.4 gives an overview
of our approach, which takes as input a single Android
app and outputs two recommended hook lists with most
likely hook code being preferentially ranked. These two
ranked lists can then be leveraged by applications or
users to support the development of many other impli-
cations such as malware detection or app repairing. We
6○App package name is specified by the package attribute of the manifest configuration (e.g., line 20 in Listing 2). Two apps with
the same app package name cannot be installed on the same device.
7○We do not consider cases where developers piggyback their own apps.
8○http://virustotal.com, Oct. 2017. We take an app as malicious if at least one anti-virus product flags it as such.
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Metric
Extraction
PDGraph
Construction
Graph
Analysis
Ranked
Hooks
Metric
Extraction
Hook
Rank
Type Hook
Type Hook 
Metric
Weight
Piggybacked
App
Implications
Fig.4. Overview of our approach.
now detail these two approaches in Subsection 3.1 and
Subsection 3.2 respectively.
3.1 Type1 Hook Identification
To automate this approach, we consider the iden-
tification of Type1 hook as a graph analysis problem.
Fig.5 illustrates the package dependency graph (PD-
Graph) of a piggybacked app (the same app as we used
in Listing 1). PDGraph is a directed graph which makes
explicit the dependency between packages. The values
reported on the edges correspond to the times a call is
made by code from package A to a method in package
B. These values are considered as the weights of the
relationships between packages. In some cases, how-
ever, this static weight may not reflect the relationship
strength between packages since a unique call link be-
tween two packages can be used multiple times at run-
time. To attenuate the importance of the weight we also
consider a scenario where weights are simply ignored.
com⊲umeng⊲common ↼↽
com⊲umeng⊲xp ↼↽
com⊲unityd⊲player ↼↽
com⊲gamegod ↼↽
org⊲fmod ↼↽
com⊲umeng⊲analytics ↼↽
com⊲mobile⊲co ↼↽
com⊲ah⊲mf ↼↽
com⊲android⊲kode⌢p ↼↽
1
4
4
132
1
4
4
3
6
Fig.5. Package dependency graph of a piggybacked app. Num-
bers between parentheses indicate the unweighted indegree val-
ues while numbers near edge lines indicate weighted indegree
values.
We now compute four metrics for estimating the re-
lationships between packages in an app.
1)Weighted Indegree. In a directed graph, the inde-
gree of a vertex is the number of headpoints adjacent to
the vertex. In the PDGraph, the weighted indegree of
a package corresponds to the number of calls that are
made from code in other packages to methods in that
package.
2) Unweighted Indegree. We compute the normal
indegree of a package in the PDGraph by counting the
number of packages that call its methods. The reason
why we take into account indegree as a metric is based
on the assumption that hackers take the least effort to
present the hook. As an example, com.gamegod in Fig.5
is actually the entry-point of the rider code, which has
a smallest indegree for both weighted and unweighted
indegree.
3) Maximum Shortest Path. Given a package, we
compute the shortest path to every other package, and
then we consider the maximum path to reach any ver-
tex. The intuition behind this metric is based on our
investigation with samples of piggybacked apps, which
shows that malware writers usually hide malicious ac-
tions far away from the hook, i.e., the multiple call
jumps from the triggering call. Thus, the maximum
shortest path in the rider module can be significantly
higher than that in carrier code.
4) Energy. We estimate the energy of a vertex
(package in the PDGraph) as an iterative sum of its
weighted outdegrees and that of its adjacent packages.
Thus, the energy of a package is total sum weight of all
packages that can be reached from its code. The energy
value helps to evaluate the importance of a package in
the stability of a graph (i.e., how relevant is the sub-
graph headed by this package?).
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The above metrics are useful for identifying pack-
ages which are entry-points into the rider code. We
build a ranked list of the packages based on a likeli-
hood score that a package is the entry point package of
the rider code. Let vi be the value computed for a met-
ric i described above (i = 1, 2 for in-degree metrics, the
smaller, the better; i = 3, 4 for the others, the bigger
the better), and wi is the weight associated to metric i.
For a PDGraph graph with n package nodes, the score
associated to a package p, with our proposed metrics,
is provided by (1).
sp =
2∑
i=1
wi × (1 −
vi(p)∑n−1
j=0 vi(j)
) +
4∑
i=3
wi × (
vi(p)∑n−1
j=0 vi(j)
). (1)
In our experiments, we weigh all metrics similarly
(i.e., ∀i, wi = 1). For each ranked package pr, the po-
tential rider code is constituted by all packages that are
reachable from pr. A hook is generally a method invo-
cation from the carrier code to the rider code. Thus, we
consider a Type1 hook as the relevant pair of packages
that are interconnected in the PDGraph.
Finally, to increase accuracy in the detection of
hooks, we further dismiss such packages (in stand-alone
hooks or in package-pair hooks) whose nodes in the PD-
Graph do not meet the following constraints.
• No Closed Walk. Because rider code and carrier
code are loosely connected, we consider that a hook
cannot be part of a directed cycle (i.e., a sequence of
vertices going from one vertex and ending on the same
vertex in a closed walk). Otherwise, we will have several
false positives, since typically, in a benign app module
(i.e., a set of related packages written for a single pur-
pose), packages in the PDGraph are usually involved in
closed walks as in the example of Fig.6.
com⊲facebook
com⊲facebook⊲widget
com⊲facebook⊲android
com⊲facebook⊲internal
Fig.6. Excerpt PDGraph showing a set of related packages in
the carrier code of com.gilpstudio.miniinimo.
• Limited Clustering Coefficient. A hook must be
viewed as the connection link between carrier code and
rider code via two packages. Since both packages belong
to different (malicious and benign) parts of the app,
they should not tend to cluster together in the package
dependency graph as it would otherwise suggest that
they are tightly coupled in the design of the app. To
implement this constraint, we measure the local cluster-
ing coefficient[19] of the vertex representing the carrier
entry package. This coefficient quantifies how close its
adjacent vertices are to be a clique (i.e., forming a com-
plete graph). Given v, a vertex, and n, the number of its
neighbors, the vertex’s coefficient cc(v) is constrained
by (2). {
cc(v) <
C2
n−1
C2
n
, if n > 2,
cc(v) = 0, otherwise.
(2)
3.2 Type2 Hook Identification
We leverage three metrics to assess the likelihood
for a given app component to be a Type2 hook. These
metrics are designed based on the following Android
concepts used in Type2 hooking.
1) Intent Filter. In Android, an Intent is a spe-
cific type of object that is dedicated to support inter-
component communication (ICC) within or across An-
droid apps. Incoming Intents are then resolved based
on Intent Filter declarations in apps’ Manifest files.
Components generally declare intent filters to describe
their capabilities, i.e., what kind of actions they can
perform (e.g., they can open audio files, view PDF files)
or which types of events they are waiting for to engage
in some processing (e.g., when bootup is completed,
when Wi-Fi status changes). The more intent filters
a component declares, the more intents it will catch,
and consequently, and the more likely its code will be
executed.
The example shown in Listing 2 presents such a
case where a component, namely com.mobile.co.UR, in
a piggybacked app, is associated with three unrelated
intent filters. This suggests that piggybackers are maxi-
mizing the opportunities for triggering the execution of
their injected malicious packages.
2) Action. In Android, action is dedicated to spec-
ifying the generic activity, such as view, that compo-
nents can perform. Intent filters leverage this attribute
to describe their capabilities. Generally, the more ac-
tions declared for a component, the most likely the com-
ponent will be triggered.
3) Category. Together with action attribute,
category provides additional information about the
kind of intent that components should handle. Basi-
cally, category raises the bar for a given component to
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resolve incoming intents because both actions and cat-
egories need to be matched. As a result, the more cate-
gories declared for a given intent filter (or component),
the less likely the component will be executed.
The above information can be used as metrics for
computing the likelihood scores of components to be
used as Type2 hooks. Based on these scores, we can
build a ranked list of the components to recommend
potential Type2 hooks. Let m be the total number of
intent filters declared by component c, fi be the score
of the i-th intent filter of component c, and wi be the
weight associated to fi, the score of the component sc
can be computed through (3).
sc =
m∑
i=1
wi × fi. (3)
We can further calculate fi through (4), where p
and q denote the number of actions and categories of fi
respectively, aj and gk stand for the score of the j-th
action and the k-th category of fi respectively while wj
and wk are the weights associated to aj and gk, respec-
tively.
fi =
p∑
j=1
wj × aj −
q∑
k=1
wk × gk. (4)
In our experiments, we give a base score 1 to all ac-
tions and categories appearing for intent filters of com-
ponents, i.e., ∀j, k, aj = 1 and gk = 1. We also weight
all metrics except action similarly, i.e., ∀i, k, wi = 1 and
wk = 1. For metric action, because of its importance,
we weight it through a mapping illustrated in Table 1.
The “count” column shows the number of occurrences
of the action indicated in the first column in all the pig-
gybacked apps that we have considered. The weight is
computed through the natural logarithm (base 10) of
the count number (e.g., 4 = ⌈log(1 693)⌉).
Table 1. Mapping from Action to Its Weight
Action Count Weight
android.intent.action.PACKAGE ADDED 1 693 4
android.net.conn.CONNECTIVITY CHANGE 1 560 4
android.intent.action.USER PRESENT 1 279 4
android.intent.action.CREATE SHORTCUT 359 3
android.intent.action.PACKAGE REMOVED 281 3
android.intent.action.BOOT COMPLETED 239 3
android.intent.action.MAIN 118 3
android.intent.action.VIEW 36 2
android.intent.action.SIG STR 26 2
android.provider.Telephony.SMS RECEIVED 23 2
android.net.wifi.WIFI STATE CHANGED 22 2
android.intent.action.CHINAMOBILE OMS GAME 13 2
Other - 1
3.3 Implementation
We now briefly introduce the implementation de-
tails of our tool-based approach called HookRanker.
HookRanker is implemented on top of Soot[20], which is
a well-known framework for analyzing and transform-
ing Java and Android apps. HookRanker works at the
Jimple level, where Jimple is an intermediate repre-
sentation (IR) of Soot. The transformation from An-
droid Dalvik bytecode to Jimple code is performed by a
tool called Dexpler[21], which now has been integrated
into Soot. The package dependency graph (PDGraph)
we build for pinpointing Type1 hooks is supported by
GraphStream[22], which is a Java library for modeling
and analyzing dynamic graphs. The reason why we
select GraphStream to build the PDGraph is that it
provides a toolkit, where a lot of common graph-based
algorithms such as computing the clustering coefficients
are already implemented and thus can be simply ap-
plied.
4 Evaluation
We now evaluate our approach that automates the
dissection of piggybacked malware to identify rider and
hook code. Our evaluation aims at answering the fol-
lowing research questions.
RQ1. How are Type1 and Type2 hooks distributed
in piggybacked apps?
RQ2. Are our proposed metrics capable of locating
Type1 and Type2 hooks in piggybacked Android apps?
If so, what is the accuracy?
RQ3. Can we leverage rider code to hunt malware
in the Android ecosystem?
Experimental Setup. All the experiments discussed
in this section are performed on a Core i7 CPU and
on a Java VM with a maximum 8 GB heap size. Al-
though the piggybacking dataset contains corner cases
where the difference of apps in piggybacking pairs still
does not clearly provide the ground truth of Type1 and
Type2 hooks, we are able to consider from the dataset
500 pairs from which we could build a benchmark for
our evaluation.
4.1 RQ1 — Distribution of Hook Types
Fig.7 illustrates the distribution of piggybacked
apps on Type1 and Type2 hooks. As shown in Fig.7(a),
159 piggybacked apps (32%) do not contain any Type1
hook, while the majority of piggybacked apps (54%)
contain only one Type1 hook.
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Fig.7. Distribution of piggybacked apps on Type1 and Type2
hooks. The text in each fan (i.e., x
y%
) shows that y% of evalu-
ated apps contain x hooks. (a) Type1 hook. (b) Type2 hook.
Fig.7(b) reveals that piggybackers are injecting
more Type2 hooks than Type1 hooks. Indeed, over
80% of evaluated piggybacked apps have injected Type2
hooks. The most common number of injected Type2
hooks is three, which is used in 126 (25.2%) piggy-
backed apps. This preference was expected for two rea-
sons. 1) On the one hand, piggybackers do not need to
pay any effort for understanding the carrier code in be-
nign apps since no connection between carrier and rider
code is needed. 2) On the other hand, the more Type2
hooks injected, the more likely the injected malicious
packages will be executed. In contrast, the more Type1
hooks are needed, the more effort piggybackers have
to put to inject them safely. Instead, we find that, in
several cases, piggybackers combine Type1 and Type2
hooks to increase the opportunities of executing mali-
cious packages.
Fig.8 further compares the distribution of piggy-
backed apps on Type1 and Type2 hooks. The median
number for Type1 hook is 1 while for Type2 is around
3. Clearly, Type2 hooks are much more favored by
piggybackers, compared with Type1 hooks. We ensure
this difference of median numbers between the datasets
is significant by performing a Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon
(MWW) test. The resulting p-value confirms that the
difference is significant at a significance level 9○ of 0.001.
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Fig.8. Distribution of piggybacked apps on Type1 and Type2
hooks.
Answer to RQ1. Both Type1 and Type2 hooks are
commonly implemented in piggybacked apps. However,
compared with Type1 hooks, Type2 hooks are much
more favored by piggybackers.
4.2 RQ2 — Hook Identification
The output of our hook identification approach,
namely HookRanker, consists of two ranked lists of po-
tential hooks (packages 10○ for Type1 hooks and compo-
nents for Type2 hooks). Our evaluation consists in ver-
ifying the percentage of hooks in the top 5 items (i.e.,
accuracy@5) in the list that are correctly identified.
To support the verification, we first automatically
build the baseline of comparison by computing the diff
(difference) between each of the selected piggybacked
apps and its corresponding original app. With this
diff (difference), we can identify the rider code and
the hook (including Type1 and Type2 hooks). Then,
we apply our dissection approach by only considering
the piggybacked apps 11○, and compare the top ranked
packages against the baseline. Table 2 enumerates the
verification results reported by our approach. Our ver-
ification is performed in two cases: Match Any Hook
and Match All Hooks. In the case of Match Any Hook,
9○Given a significance level α = 0.001, if p-value < α, there is one chance in a thousand that the difference between the compared
two datasets is due to a coincidence.
10○Packages encompass sufficient information for analysts to quickly locate the relevant pair of packages that are interconnected in
the PDGraph. For simplicity, we only consider packages in this work.
11○We remind the readers that our goal is to identify hooks of piggybacked apps without knowing their original counterparts, i.e.,
the “diff” cannot be computed in practice.
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where we consider an app verified as long as one of its
hooks is located, HookRanker yields an accuracy@5 (we
check the top 5 packages) of 89.4% for Type1 hooks and
an accuracy@5 (we only check the top 5 components)
of 99.5% for Type2 hooks if any one hook is matched.
In the case of Match All Hooks, where we consider an
app is verified if and only if all of its hooks are located,
HookRanker yields an accuracy@5 of 83.6% for Type1
hooks and an accuracy@5 of 82.2% for Type2 hooks.
For such apps that have more than five hooks, we con-
sider them to be not verified.
Table 2. Hook Identification Results (Accuracy@5)
Type Hook-Infected/Total Match Match
Apps Any Hook All Hooks
Type1 341/500 305 (89.4%) 285 (83.6%)
Type2 428/500 426 (99.5%) 352 (82.2%)
Our manual analysis on the dissecting results fur-
ther provides some insights into how malware writ-
ers perform piggybacking at a large scale. Table 3
and Table 4 present five samples of Type1 hooks (at
the package level) and Type2 hooks (at the compo-
nent level), respectively. Both tables show that some
malicious packages are repeatedly injected into (diffe-
rent) Android apps. For example, com.google.ads, an
AD-related package, has been injected into seven be-
nign apps while package com.fivefeiwo.coverscreen.SR
appears in 50 distinct piggybacked apps. This repeat-
ing phenomenon suggests that piggybacking could be
performed in batches.
Table 3. Five Ranked Type1 Hook Samples and
Their Affected Number of Apps
Type1 Hook Number of
Affected Apps
com.unity3d.player → com.gamegod 12
com.unity3d.player → com.google.ads 7
com.unity3d.player → com.basyatw.bcpawsen 5
com.ansca.corona → com.google.ads 3
com.g5e → com.geseng 2
Table 4. Five Ranked Type2 Hook Samples and
Their Affected Number of Apps
Type2 Hook Type Number of
Affected Apps
com.fivefeiwo.coverscreen.SR Receiver 50
net.crazymedia.iad.AdPushReceiver Receiver 48
com.kuguo.ad.MainReceiver Receiver 48
com.zpvg.cvjaoyt.BawnHawn Receiver 33
com.czvzoytyttq.fbmszy.Laoenawy Receiver 33
Now, let us look one step deeper into the fre-
quency of injected Type1 hooks (in Table 3): piggy-
backers often connect their packages to the carrier via
one of its included libraries. Thus, malware can sys-
tematize the piggybacking operation by targeting apps
that use some popular libraries. For example, package
com.unity3d.player is the infection point in 65 (out
of the 500) piggybacked apps. In 12 of these apps, the
entry package of the rider code is com.gamegod.
We further summarize the type of located Type2
hooks in Fig.9. Clearly, receiver is the most imple-
mented component type of Type2 hooks. This find-
ing is actually what we expected, because receiver is
much easier to trigger compared with other component
types. Indeed, in addition to user-defined events, re-
ceiver can also listen to system events. Whenever a
broadcast event arrives, receiver with the corresponding
capability declared will be triggered and consequently
propagate the execution to other code.
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Fig.9. Distribution of the component type of Type2 hooks.
As shown in Fig.9, after receiver, the second ap-
pearing component type for Type2 hooks is activity.
The fact that activity is more favored than service is
actually surprising to us. Compared with activity, ser-
vice does not need to be involved in user interfaces and
thus can be executed stealthily. This feature should be
more fit for the requirements of piggybackers. There-
fore, we go one step deeper to investigate the reason
why this happens. To this end, we summarize the capa-
bilities leveraged by the newly injected activities. The
most declared activity-based action appears to be CRE-
ATE SHORTCUT, which is used for creating shortcuts
for Android apps, resulting in an alternative way to
launch the apps (the code executed in this way can be
totally independent from the true app code). This fact
suggests that piggybackers are intended to maximize
the possibility of triggering the execution of their in-
jected malicious packages.
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Answer to RQ2. HookRanker is efficient in locating
both Type1 and Type2 hooks. Our in-depth analysis
on the located malicious packages further discloses that
1) piggybacking process is likely performed in batches;
2) Broadcast Receiver is the most adopted component
type for implementing Type2 hooks.
4.3 RQ3 — Rider-Based Malware Detection
After collecting snippets of malicious rider code
from piggybacked apps, we now explore their potential
for improving malware detection approaches.
4.3.1 Basic Malware Detection
In a first scenario, we consider the case of machine
learning (ML) based malware detection leveraging fea-
tures of the identified rider code in our ground truth
of piggybacked apps. The malware prediction in this
case is a one-class classification problem as we only con-
sider features (malicious packages) that malware sam-
ples exhibit. For this experiment, we consider each
malicious package as a distinct feature, e.g., package
“com.gamegod” shown in Fig.5 is thus a feature in our
feature set; if a given app has a package starting with
“com.gamegod”, we set the value of (“com.gamegod”)
feature to “TRUE” (“FALSE”, otherwise). We first
apply the classifier built with these new features on our
ground truth. In 10-fold cross-validation experiments,
using the RandomForest classification algorithm[23], we
have recorded an accuracy of 91.6% in identifying An-
droid malware. These results suggest that rider code
features are effective in detecting piggybacked malware.
It is worth mentioning that our objective in this
work is not to propose an ML-based malware detection
approach that outperforms the state of the art. Instead,
we simply show that collected malicious packages are
recurrent and promising ingredients for discriminating
malware from benign apps. Therefore, it is expected
that the accuracy achieved by our approach may not
be so good as the state-of-the-art ones. Nevertheless,
we believe well-designed fine-grained features based on
such collected malicious packages would lead to better
results. However, to explore this interesting direction
is out of the scope of this work and therefore we take it
as our future work.
We further investigate the MalGenome dataset to
determine the proportion of malicious apps which share
the same malicious packages with the piggybacked apps
of our ground truth. To that end we consider the pack-
age dependency graph of each app of the MalGenome
dataset and map them with the collection of rider
package pairs collected in our ground truth. 125
MalGenome apps contain only one package. They are
thus irrelevant for our study. Among those apps with
several packages, 252 (i.e., 22.2%) contain rider code
features of our ground truth. With a malware detec-
tion tool based on our rider code collection, we could
have directly flagged such apps with no further analysis.
4.3.2 Malware Family Classification
In a second scenario, we consider the case of classi-
fying malware to specific families based on the rider
features. To that end, we consider the apps of our
ground truth dataset and apply our dissection ap-
proach. We then collect the identified rider pack-
ages of all apps where each package represents a dis-
tinct feature, and apply the Expectation-Maximization
(EM)[24] algorithm on the edges related to rider code
in the app PDGraph to cluster them. This leads to the
construction of five clusters of varying sizes. Here the
number of clusters (5) is directly computed by the EM
algorithm, which is able to infer a suitable number of
clusters to optimize the distance among clusters. Our
objective is then to investigate whether the clusters of
rider code are also related to specific malware families.
In this paper, we consider the labels 12○ that anti-virus
products from VirusTotal provide after analysing the
piggybacked apps corresponding to the rider code in
each cluster. Other familial classification studies such
as the one presented by Fan et al.[25], where frequent
subgraph (to represent the common behavior or mal-
ware) is leveraged, could be also leveraged to achieve
the same purpose (i.e., to build Android malware fam-
ilies).
dJaccard(fa, fb) =
|fa ∪ fb| − |fa ∩ fb|
|fa ∪ fb|
, (5)
fa =
k⋃
i=1
Li. (6)
We compute the Jaccard distance (5) between the
sets of labels for the different clusters. As an example,
given a cluster a, fa denotes a union set of anti-virus
labels, which can be computed through (6), where Li
stands for a set of anti-virus labels that VirusTotal gives
for appi. The results summarized in Table 5 and Table 6
reveal that the malware labels in a given cluster are
12○An anti-virus label (e.g., Android.Trojan.DroidKungFu2.A) represents the signature identified in a malicious app.
Li Li et al.: On Locating Malicious Code in Piggybacked Android Apps 1119
distant from those of any other clusters. This suggests
that the dissected rider code contributes to malware of
specific families.
Table 5. Number of Apps and Anti-Virus Labels of the
Clusters Built Based on Rider Code
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
Number of apps 10 236 27 7 37
Number of anti-virus labels 22 269 51 5 27
Table 6. Jaccard Distance (Dissimilarity) of Malware Label
Sets Between Clusters Built Based on Rider Code
C1 C2 C3 C4 C5
C1 0.00 0.96 0.89 0.92 0.88
C2 0.96 0.00 0.91 0.99 0.96
C3 0.89 0.91 0.00 0.94 0.94
C4 0.92 0.99 0.94 0.00 0.95
C5 0.88 0.96 0.94 0.95 0.00
We also consider clustering the piggybacked apps
based directly on the malware labels. The EM algo-
rithm produces six clusters. We then compute the Jac-
card distance between each of those clusters and the
five clusters of apps previously constructed based on
rider code. Table 7 and Table 8 summarize the results
which reveal that each cluster (built based on malware
labels) is much closer to a single cluster (built based on
rider code) than to any other clusters. The difference is
not significantly high for clusters C1 and C4, two cases
where the contained app sets are small. Nevertheless,
these experimental results overall illustrate that the
malicious packages ungrafted from piggybacked apps
indeed represent a signature of a malware family.
Table 7. Number of Apps and Anti-Virus Labels of the
Clusters Built Based on Anti-Virus Labels
MC1 MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5 MC6
Number of apps 90 44 69 47 14 53
Number of anti-virus labels 170 82 35 57 13 67
Table 8. Jaccard Distance of Malware Label
Sets Between Clusters of Apps
MC1 MC2 MC3 MC4 MC5 MC6
C1 0.90 0.90 0.84 0.87 0.97 0.91
C2 0.43 0.70 0.88 0.79 0.96 0.85
C3 0.91 0.90 0.93 0.89 0.93 0.24
C4 0.99 0.94 0.95 0.97 0.94 0.96
C5 0.96 0.93 0.73 0.94 0.55 0.95
Note: MCi is a cluster built based on anti-virus labels, while Ci
is a cluster built based on rider code features.
Answer to RQ3. The located rider code is help-
ful for supporting malware detection approaches. Our
empirical experiment further illustrates that malicious
packages incorporate good features for grouping mali-
cious apps into families.
5 Discussion
Our approach and the experiments presented in this
work introduce a few threats to validity.
• First, our dissection is at the granularity level of
packages. Additional efforts may apply if one wants to
infer low-level artifacts (e.g., class or method). How-
ever, based on our experiments, it is relatively easy to
infer the low-level method/class calls involved in a hook
code (because of weak connection) once the correspond-
ing packages have been identified.
• Second, in order to present a fast solution, we
construct the PDGraph in a context-insensitive man-
ner and we take no account of inter-component com-
munication (ICC), reflective calls (including dynami-
cally loaded code) and native code. This trade-off may
result in false positives. In our future work, we plan to
integrate IccTA[7] and DroidRA[26] into our approach
for taking care of ICC and reflective calls.
• Third, HookRanker is implemented based on the
assumption that malicious code and the original benign
code are loosely coupled. However, this assumption
may not always be true and hence may lead to a ranked
list that is irrelevant to the desired malicious packages,
unfortunately resulting in more efforts for security an-
alysts to identify the real malicious code. However, as
demonstrated by Li et al.[9], attackers (or piggybackers)
usually want to make the least effort to inject their mali-
cious payloads, generally resulting in only small changes
being made, and therefore leading to loosely coupled
benign and malicious packages. In other words, our
assumption should remain valid for most piggybacked
malicious apps, making our approach relevant for many
cases.
• Fourth, our approach has no specific treatment
to deal with obfuscation. Theoretically, HookRanker
should not be impacted by basic obfuscation techniques
such as renaming but would be impacted by advanced
techniques such as control flow alterations. Nonethe-
less, deobfuscation approaches such as DeGUARD[27]
and the one presented by Wang and Rountev[28] could
be applied to limit the impact of obfuscation. So far,
because of Android app packers such as Bangcle, Ijiami,
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which aim at preventing Android apps from being re-
verse engineered and further repackaged, HookRanker
is also not able to tackle packed piggybacked mali-
cious apps. Fortunately, state-of-the-art approaches
including DexHunter[29] and PackerGrind[30] have al-
ready demonstrated promising results for extracting
DEX code from those packed apps, making it still pos-
sible for HookRanker to tackle packed apps and thereby
to locate malicious packages.
• Finally, it is hard to know whether a given mal-
ware is piggybacked from other apps (because of lack-
ing ground truth) or is built from scratch by “bad”
guys. As HookRanker will attempt to yield ranked
lists of packages and components in any case, apply-
ing our approach to non-piggybacked malware may
result in false alarms. In other words, HookRanker
should not be applied to normal malware developed
from scratch, because the enumerated potential hooks
might mislead the analysis of security analysts. To mit-
igate this, we argue that there is a need to automati-
cally infer piggybacked apps, even when the original
app is not “known” (e.g., identifying piggybacked apps
through machine learning based techniques[31] or symp-
toms based approaches[32]). Nonetheless, it is out of
the scope of this paper to automatically identify piggy-
backed apps. We take it as our future work.
As for future work, we also plan to directly per-
form our graph analysis in the class or method level,
where the fine-grained results could be more accurate
for analysts to identify malicious behaviours and for
rider-based malware classifiers. Furthermore, we would
like to investigate other means (e.g., community de-
tection on the built graph) to improve the accuracy
of our approach. Finally, we plan to conduct a user
study and consequently to understand to what ex-
tend HookRanker can help analysts dissect piggybacked
apps, where their original counterparts are unknown.
Last but not the least, the findings of our ap-
proach, namely the hook and the rider code, could be
used to boost many more implications. In addition
to the one we have demonstrated in RQ3, where we
have shown how our results can be leveraged for mal-
ware detection, another potential implication is to ex-
ploit the hook/rider code to develop an automatic app
repair/blocking approach which disconnects the rider
code or disassembles the hook so that the malicious
payload would not be triggered. As demonstrated by
Li et al.[9], third-party libraries are frequently compro-
mised to include malicious payloads. Therefore, based
on a whitelist of known libraries[15,33-35], it is possible
to supplement this work with a comparison between
released and in-app library code. If the in-app library
code is substantially different from the known publicly
released version, it hints on probable attack on the li-
brary code (e.g., hook introduction to trigger malicious
code). Moreover, since our approach provides quanti-
tative outputs (i.e., the rank), it could be utilized to
rank Android apps based on the extent of the suspi-
ciousness on their malicious status. This ranking can
benefit app vetting processes for both end users and
security analysts.
6 Related Work
In a recent study with anti-virus products, re-
searchers have shown that malware is still widespread
within Android markets[36]. This finding is in line
with regular reports from anti-virus companies where
they reveal that Android has become the most tar-
geted platform by malware writers. Research on sys-
tematic detection of Android malware is nevertheless
still maturing[9]. Machine learning techniques, by al-
lowing sifting through large sets of applications to de-
tect malicious applications based on measures of simi-
larity of features, appear to be promising for large-scale
malware detection[4,37-39].
Cesare and Xiang[40] proposed to use similarity on
control flow graphs to detect variants of known mal-
ware. Chen et al.[10] presented an approach named
MassVet that compares a submitted app with all those
existing ones in a market, vetting Android apps based
on the commonality in UI structures and differences
in components. Eventually, their approach suspects a
given app of being malicious based on unusual compo-
nents. Our work however focuses on analyzing each app
to highlight potential components which contribute to
the malicious payloads. Hu et al.[41] described SMIT,
a scalable approach relying on pruning function Call
Graphs of x86 malware to reduce the cost of computing
graph distances. SMIT leverages a vantage point tree
but for large-scale malware indexing and queries. Simi-
larly, BitShred[42] focuses on large-scale malware triage
analysis by using feature hashing techniques to dramat-
ically reduce the dimensions in the constructed malware
feature space. After reduction, pair-wise comparison is
still necessary to infer similar malware families[43].
PiggyApp[12] is the work that focuses on piggy-
backed app detection. The authors improved over their
previous work, namely DroidMoss[44], which was deal-
ing with repackaged app detection. PiggyApp, simi-
lar to our approach, is based on the assumption that
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a piece of code added to an already existing app will
be loosely coupled with rest of the application’s code.
Consequently, given an app, PiggyApp builds its pro-
gram dependency graph, and assigns weights to the
edges in accordance to the degree of relationship be-
tween the packages. Then, it uses an agglomerative
algorithm to cluster the packages and thereby to select
the primary module of the app, which is further lever-
aged to highlight piggybacked apps by comparing with
other selected primary modules. To escape the scala-
bility problem with pair-wise comparisons, the authors
of [12] relied on the vantage point tree data structure
to partition the metric space and eventually to detect
piggybacked apps. The identified piggybacked apps can
be taken as the input of our approach.
Researchers use a set of diverse features to detect
malware. In 2012, Sahs and Khan[4] built an Android
malware detector with features based on a combina-
tion of Android-specific permissions and a control-flow
graph representation. Use of permissions and API calls
as features was proposed by Wu et al.[45] In 2013, Amos
et al.[46] leveraged dynamic application profiling in their
malware detector. Demme et al.[1] also used dynamic
application analysis to profile malware. Yerima et al.[2]
built malware classifiers based on API calls, external
program execution and permissions. Canfora et al.[3]
experimented feature sets based on SysCalls and per-
missions. Zhang et al.[47] used weighted contextual API
dependency graphs as program semantics to classify
Android malware, where they leveraged graph simila-
rity metrics to disclose homogeneous app behavior.
Unfortunately, through extensive evaluations, the
community of ML-based malware detection has not
yet shown that current malware detectors for Android
are actually efficient in detecting malware in the wild.
Chief reason among the candidate ones to this situation
is the fact that features are “elaborated” by research
teams based on the behaviour of specific malware fami-
lies whose behavioural description has provided the in-
tuitions for constructing the classifiers. Furthermore,
because most malware is actually piggybacked from be-
nign apps, the ML-based features are probably similar
to those extracted from benign apps, making them in-
distinguishable for ML-based malware detection (e.g.,
due to the multi-generation repackaging problem[48]).
Indeed, as pointed out by Meng et al.[49], the cur-
rent feature-based malware detection approaches are
not enough because they cannot provide detailed in-
formation beyond their mere detection. They thus
proposed an alternative approach that leverages se-
mantic features (based on deterministic symbolic au-
tomaton (DSA)) to comprehensive Android malware
and thereby to detect and classify them. As another
example, Tian et al.[50] proposed an approach that
leverages code heterogeneity analysis to detect repack-
aged Android malware. Given an Android app, they
strategically partitioned its code structure into multi-
ple dependence-based regions, where each region is a
basic unit that will be independently classified on its
behavioural features.
Our work differs from them in a way that we actu-
ally focus on extracting the malicious packages (rider
code) from piggybacked apps. Based on the located
rider code, our approach can be used to compliment
those approaches by allowing them for better represen-
tation of features and better classification of malware,
e.g., through the implementation of multi-classifiers,
taking into account the different ways that exist for
writing malware (and indirectly different structures and
behaviours of malware).
7 Conclusions
We proposed in this paper an approach for dissect-
ing piggybacked apps to locate and collect malicious
samples. Through extensive evaluations, we demon-
strated the performance of our approach, i.e., the pre-
cision of locating hook/rider code. We also experimen-
tally showed that the collected malicious packages (i.e.,
rider code) can be leveraged to detect new malicious
apps. Further investigations revealed that rider code
clusters strongly correlated with the clusters character-
ized via malware signatures given by anti-virus prod-
ucts.
References
[1] Demme J, Maycock M, Schmitz J, Tang A, Waksman A,
Sethumadhavan S, Stolfo S. On the feasibility of online
malware detection with performance counters. In Proc. the
40th Annual Int. Symp. Computer Architecture, June 2013,
pp.559-570.
[2] Yerima S Y, Sezer S, McWilliams G, Muttik I. A new An-
droid malware detection approach using Bayesian classifi-
cation. In Proc. the 27th IEEE Int. Conf. Advanced Infor-
mation Networking and Applications (AINA), March 2013,
pp.121-128.
[3] Canfora G, Mercaldo F, Visaggio C A. A classifier of ma-
licious Android applications. In Proc. the 8th Int. Conf.
Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES), September
2013, pp.607-614.
1122 J. Comput. Sci. & Technol., Nov. 2017, Vol.32, No.6
[4] Sahs J, Khan L. A machine learning approach to Android
malware detection. In Proc. European Intelligence and Se-
curity Informatics Conf (EISIC ), August 2012, pp.141-
147.
[5] Symantec. 2015 Internet Security Threat Report: Attackers
are bigger, bolder, and faster. https://www.symant-
ec.com/connect/blogs/2015-internet-security-threat-repor-
t-attackers-are-bigger-bolder-and-faster, Oct. 2017.
[6] Zhou Y J, Jiang X X. Dissecting Android malware: Char-
acterization and evolution. In Proc. IEEE Symp. Security
and Privacy (SP), May 2012, pp.95-109.
[7] Li L, Bartel A, Bissyande´ T F, Klein J, Le Traon Y, Arzt S,
Rasthofer S, Bodden E, Octeau D, Mcdaniel P. IccTA: De-
tecting inter-component privacy leaks in Android apps. In
Proc. the 37th Int. Conf. Software Engineering, May 2015,
pp.280-291
[8] Arp D, Spreitzenbarth M, Hu¨bner M, Gascon H, Rieck K.
DREBIN: Effective and explainable detection of Android
malware in your pocket. In Proc. Network and Distributed
System Security Symp. (NDSS), February 2014.
[9] Li L, Li D Y, Bissyande T F, Klein J, Le Traon Y, Lo D,
Cavallaro L. Understanding Android app piggybacking: A
systematic study of malicious code grafting. IEEE Trans.
Information Forensics and Security, 2017, 12(6): 1269-
1284.
[10] Chen K, Wang P, Lee Y, Wang X F, Zhang N, Huang H Q,
Zou W, Liu P. Finding unknown malice in 10 seconds: Mass
vetting for new threats at the Google-play scale. In Proc. the
24th USENIX Conf. Security Symp., August 2015, pp.659-
674.
[11] Li L, Li D Y, Bissyande´ T F, Klein J, Cai H P, Lo D,
Le Traon Y. Automatically locating malicious packages in
piggybacked Android apps. In Proc. the 4th IEEE/ACM
Int. Conf. Mobile Software Engineering and Systems (MO-
BILESoft), May 2017, pp.170-174.
[12] Zhou W, Zhou Y J, Grace M, Jiang X X, Zou S H. Fast,
scalable detection of “piggybacked” mobile applications. In
Proc. the 3rd ACM Conf. Data and Application Security
and Privacy, February 2013, pp.185-196.
[13] Li L, Li D Y, Bissyande´ T F D A, Lo D, Klein J, Le Traon Y.
Ungrafting malicious code from piggybacked Android apps.
Technical Report, University of Luxembourg, 2016.
[14] Li L, Gao J, Hurier M, Kong P F, Bissyande´ T F,
Bartel A, Klein J, Le Traon Y. AndroZoo++: Col-
lecting millions of Android apps and their metadata
for the research community. arXiv: 1709.05281, 2017.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.05281, October 2017.
[15] Li L, Bissyande´ T F, Klein J, Le Traon Y. An investigation
into the use of common libraries in Android apps. In Proc.
the 23rd IEEE Int. Conf. Software Analysis, Evolution, and
Reengineering (SANER), March 2016, pp.403-414.
[16] Li L, Martinez J, Ziadi T, Bissyande´ T F, Klein J, Le Traon
Y. Mining families of Android applications for extractive
SPL adoption. In Proc. the 20th Int. Systems and Software
Product Line Conf., September 2016, pp.271-275.
[17] Allix K, Bissyande´ T F, Je´rome Q, Klein J, State R, Le
Traon Y. Empirical assessment of machine learning-based
malware detectors for Android. Empirical Software Engi-
neering, 2016, 21(1): 183-211.
[18] Li L, Bissyande´ T F, Klein J. SimiDroid: Identifying and ex-
plaining similarities in Android apps. In Proc. IEEE Trust-
com/BigDataSE/ICESS, August 2017, pp.136-143.
[19] Watts D J, Strogatz S H. Collective dynamics of ‘small-
world’ networks. Nature, 1998, 393(6684): 440-442.
[20] Lam P, Bodden E, Lhotak O, Hendren L. The soot frame-
work for Java program analysis: A retrospective. In Proc.
Cetus Users and Compiler Infastructure Workshop (CE-
TUS2011 ), October 2011.
[21] Bartel A, Klein J, Le Traon Y, Monperrus M. Dexpler: Con-
verting Android Dalvik bytecode to Jimple for static anal-
ysis with Soot. In Proc. ACM SIGPLAN Int. Workshop
on State of the Art in Java Program Analysis, June 2012,
pp.27-38.
[22] Dutot A, Guinand F, Olivier D, Pigne´ Y. GraphStream:
A tool for bridging the gap between complex systems and
dynamic graphs. In Proc. ECCS, October 2007.
[23] Breiman L. Random forests. Machine Learning, 2001,
45(1): 5-32.
[24] Dempster A P, Laird N M, Rubin D B. Maximum likelihood
from incomplete data via the EM algorithm. Journal of the
Royal Statistical Society, 1977, 39(1): 1-38.
[25] Fan M, Liu J, Luo X P, Chen K, Chen T Y, Tian Z Z, Zhang
X D, Zheng Q H, Liu T. Frequent subgraph based familial
classification of Android malware. In Proc. the 27th IEEE
Int. Symp. Software Reliability Engineering (ISSRE), Oc-
tober 2016, pp.24-35.
[26] Li L, Bissyande´ T F, Octeau D, Klein J. DroidRA: Tam-
ing reflection to support whole-program analysis of Android
apps. In Proc. the 25th Int. Symp. Software Testing and
Analysis, July 2016, pp.318-329.
[27] Bichsel B, Raychev V, Tsankov P, Vechev M. Statisti-
cal deobfuscation of Android applications. In Proc. ACM
SIGSAC Conf. Computer and Communications Security,
October 2016, pp.343-355.
[28] Wang Y, Rountev A. Who changed you? Obfuscator iden-
tification for Android. In Proc. the 4th IEEE/ACM Int.
Conf. Mobile Software Engineering and Systems, May 2017,
pp.154-164.
[29] Zhang Y Q, Luo X P, Yin H Y. DexHunter: Toward extract-
ing hidden code from packed Android applications. In Proc.
the 20th European Symp. Research in Computer Security,
September 2015, pp.293-311.
[30] Xue L, Luo X P, Yu L, Wang S, Wu D H. Adaptive unpack-
ing of Android apps. In Proc. the 39th Int. Conf. Software
Engineering, May 2017, pp.358-369.
[31] Shao Y R, Luo X P, Qian C X, Zhu P F, Zhang L. Towards a
scalable resource-driven approach for detecting repackaged
Android applications. In Proc. the 30th Annual Computer
Security Applications Conf., December 2014, pp.56-65.
[32] Gonzalez H, Kadir A A, Stakhanova N, Alzahrani A J,
Ghorbani A A. Exploring reverse engineering symptoms in
Android apps. In Proc. the 8th European Workshop on Sys-
tem Security, April 2015, Article No. 7.
[33] Li M H, Wang W, Wang P, Wang S, Wu D H, Liu J, Xue
R, Huo W. LibD: Scalable and precise third-party library
detection in Android markets. In Proc. the 39th Int. Conf.
Software Engineering, May 2017, pp.335-346.
Li Li et al.: On Locating Malicious Code in Piggybacked Android Apps 1123
[34] Ma Z A, Wang H Y, Guo Y, Chen X Q. LibRadar: Fast
and accurate detection of third-party libraries in Android
apps. In Proc. the 38th Int. Conf. Software Engineering
Companion, May 2016 pp.653-656.
[35] Wang H Y, Guo Y. Understanding third-party libraries in
mobile app analysis. In Proc. the 39th IEEE/ACM Int.
Conf. Software Engineering Companion, May 2017, pp.515-
516.
[36] Nagappan M Shihab E. Future trends in software engi-
neering research for mobile apps. In Proc. the 23rd IEEE
Int. Conf. Software Analysis, Evolution, and Reengineering
(SANER), March 2016, pp.21-32.
[37] Kolter J Z Maloof M A. Learning to detect and classify
malicious executables in the wild. The Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 2006, 7: 2721-2744.
[38] Zhang B Y, Yin J P, Hao J B, Zhang D X, Wang S L. Mali-
cious codes detection based on ensemble learning. In Proc.
the 4th Int. Conf. Autonomic and Trusted Computing, July
2007, pp.468-477.
[39] Perdisci R, Lanzi A, Lee W. McBoost: Boosting scalability
in malware collection and analysis using statistical classifi-
cation of executables. In Proc. Annual Computer Security
Applications Conf., December 2008, pp.301-310.
[40] Cesare S, Xiang Y. Classification of malware using struc-
tured control flow. In Proc. the 8th Australasian Symp.
Parallel and Distributed Computing, January 2010, pp.61-
70.
[41] Hu X, Chiueh T C, Shin K G. Large-scale malware index-
ing using function-call graphs. In Proc. the 16th ACM Conf.
Computer and Communications Security, November 2009
pp.611-620.
[42] Jang J, Brumley D, Venkataraman S. BitShred: Feature
hashing malware for scalable triage and semantic analysis.
In Proc. the 18th ACM Conf. Computer and Communica-
tions Security, October 2011 pp.309-320.
[43] Linares-Va´squez M, Holtzhauer A, Poshyvanyk D. On auto-
matically detecting similar Android apps. In Proc. the 24th
IEEE Int. Conf. Program Comprehension (ICPC ), May
2016.
[44] Zhou W, Zhou Y J, Jiang X X, Ning P. Detecting repack-
aged smart phone applications in third-party Android mar-
ketplaces. In Proc. the 2nd ACM Conf. Data and Applica-
tion Security and Privacy, February 2012, pp.317-326.
[45] Wu D J, Mao CH, Wei TE, Lee HM, Wu KP. DroidMat:
Android malware detection through manifest and API calls
tracing. In Proc. the 7th Asia Joint Conf. Information Se-
curity (AsiaJCIS), August 2012, pp.62-69.
[46] Amos B, Turner H, White J. Applying machine learning
classifiers to dynamic Android malware detection at scale.
In Proc. the 9th Int. Wireless Communications and Mobile
Computing Conf. (IWCMC ), July 2013, pp.1666-1671.
[47] Zhang M, Duan Y, Yin H, Zhao Z R. Semantics-aware
Android malware classification using weighted contextual
API dependency graphs. In Proc. ACM SIGSAC Conf.
Computer and Communications Security, November 2014,
pp.1105-1116.
[48] Li L, Bissyande´ T F, Bartel A, Klein J, Le Traon Y. The
multigeneration repackaging hypothesis. In Proc. the 39th
IEEE/ACM Int. Conf. Software Engineering, May 2017
pp.344-346.
[49] Meng G Z, Xue Y X, Xu Z Z, Liu Y, Zhang J, Narayanan A.
Semantic modelling of Android malware for effective mal-
ware comprehension, detection, and classification. In Proc.
the 25th Int. Symp. Software Testing and Analysis, July
2016, pp.306-317.
[50] Tian K, Yao D F, Ryder B G, Tan G. Analysis of code
heterogeneity for high-precision classification of repackaged
malware. In Proc. IEEE Security and Privacy Workshops
(SPW ), May 2016 pp.262-271.
Li Li is a research associate at
Interdisciplinary Center for Security,
Reliability and Trust (SnT), University
of Luxembourg, Luxembourg, and a
honorary research associate at the
CREST group, University College
London, London. He received his
Ph.D. degree in computer science from the University of
Luxembourg, Luxembourg. His research interests are in
the fields of Android security, static code analysis, and
machine learning. Dr. Li received a Best Paper Award at
the ERA Track of IEEE SANER 2016.
Daoyuan Li is currently working
towards his Ph.D. degree at University
of Luxembourg, Luxembourg. His
research is mainly focused on machine
learning, especially time series classi-
fication and its applications in smart
buildings, IoT and FinTech. He loves
(open source) software and writes code
to get his thoughts straight or to prove a point. Previously
he worked as technical director in a startup company in
China and before that was a research scientist at Ericsson
Research NomadicLab, Finland.
Tegawende´ F. Bissyande´ is a
research scientist with Interdisciplinary
Center for Security, Reliability and
Trust (SnT), University of Luxem-
bourg, Luxembourg. He received his
Ph.D. degree in computer science from
the University of Bordeaux, Bordeaux,
in 2013. His work is mainly related to software engineering,
specifically empirical software engineering, reliability and
debugging as well as mobile app analysis. His studies were
presented in major conferences such as ICSE, ISSTA and
ASE, and published in top journals such as Empirical
Software Engineering and IEEE TIFS. He has received a
Best Paper Award at ASE 2012, and has served in several
program committees including ASE-Demo, ACM SAC,
ICPC.
1124 J. Comput. Sci. & Technol., Nov. 2017, Vol.32, No.6
Jacques Klein is senior research sci-
entist at the University of Luxembourg,
Luxembourg, and at the Interdisci-
plinary Centre for Security, Reliability
and Trust (SnT). He received his Ph.D.
degree in computer science from the
University of Rennes, Rennes, in 2006.
His main areas of expertise are threefold: 1) mobile
security (malware detection, prevention and dissection,
static analysis for security, vulnerability detection, etc.); 2)
software reliability (software testing, semi-automated and
fully-automated program repair, etc.); 3) data analytics
(multi-objective reasoning and optimization, model-driven
data analytics, time series pattern recognition, etc.). In
addition to academic achievements, Dr. Klein has also
standing experience and expertise on successfully running
industrial projects with several industrial partners in
various domains by applying data analytics, software
engineering, information retrieval, etc., to their research
problems.
Haipeng Cai received his Ph.D.
degree in computer science and engi-
neering from the University of Notre
Dame, Notre Dame, in 2015. He worked
on computer graphics and visualizations
during his previous graduate studies
and was a software developer in Internet
search services and embedded systems.
He is currently an assistant professor in the School of Elec-
trical Engineering and Computer Science at Washington
State University, Pullman. His research interests are in
software engineering and software systems in general with
emphasis on program analysis and its applications for the
quality, security and reliability of evolving software. He is
a member of ACM and IEEE.
David Lo is an associate professor
in School of Information Systems,
Singapore Management University,
Singapore. He is working in the
intersection of software engineering
and data mining research. He is an
active researcher in the emerging field
of software analytics that focuses on
the design and development of specialized data analysis
techniques to solve software engineering problems. He has
received a number of international awards including two
ACM Distinguished Paper Awards. He has contributed
as an organizing committee member of many conferences;
the upcoming ones include serving as a program co-chair
of the 34th IEEE International Conference on Software
Maintenance and Evolution (ICSME’18) and workshop
co-chair of the 41st ACM/IEEE International Conference
on Software Engineering (ICSE’19). He serves/served in
the steering committee of the IEEE International Confe-
rence on Software ANalysis, Evolution and Reengineering
(SANER), IEEE International Working Conference on
Source Code Analysis and Manipulation (SCAM), and
IEEE/ACM International Conference on Automated Soft-
ware Engineering (ASE). He is an editorial board member
of Empirical Software Engineering, Journal of Software:
Evolution and Process, Information and Software Techno-
logy, Information Systems, and Neurocomputing.
Yves Le Traon is professor at Uni-
versity of Luxembourg, Luxembourg,
where he leads the SERVAL (SEcurity,
Reasoning and VALidation) research
team. His research interests within
the group include 1) innovative testing
and debugging techniques, 2) Android
apps security and reliability using static
code analysis, and machine learning techniques, and 3)
model-driven engineering with a focus on IoT and CPS.
He has been General Chair of major conferences in the do-
main, such as the 2013 IEEE International Conference on
Software Testing, Verification and Validation (ICST), and
Program Chair of the 2016 IEEE International Conference
on Software Quality, Reliability and Security (QRS). He
serves at the editorial boards of several internationally-
known journals (STVR, SoSym, IEEE Transactions on
Reliability) and is author of more than 160 publications in
international peer-reviewed conferences and journals.
